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Noradrenergic  pathways  are  involved  in  mediating  the  central  and peripheral  effects  of  physiological
arousal.  The  aim of the present  study  was  to investigate  the role of  noradrenergic  transmission  in  moral
decision-making.  We  studied  the effects  in  healthy  volunteers  of propranolol  (a noradrenergic  beta-
adrenoceptor  antagonist)  on  moral  judgement  in a set  of  moral  dilemmas  pitting  utilitarian  outcomes
(e.g.,  saving  ﬁve  lives)  against  highly  aversive  harmful  actions  (e.g.,  killing  an  innocent  person)  in  a  double-
blind,  placebo-controlled,  parallel  group  design.  Propranolol  (40  mg  orally)  signiﬁcantly  reduced  heart
rate,  but  had  no  effect  on  self-reported  mood.  Importantly,  propranolol  made  participants  more  likely to
judge  harmful  actions  as  morally  unacceptable,  but  only  in  dilemmas  where  harms  were  ‘up close  and
personal’.  In addition,  longer  response  times  for such  personal  dilemmas  were  only  found  for  the  placebo
group.  Finally,  judgments  in  personal  dilemmas  by  the  propranolol  group  were  more  decisive.  These
ﬁndings  indicate  that  noradrenergic  pathways  play a role  in responses  to moral  dilemmas,  in  line with
recent  work  implicating  emotion  in  moral  decision-making.  However,  contrary  to  current  theorising,
these  ﬁndings  also  suggest  that  aversion  to harming  is  not  driven  by  emotional  arousal.  Our  ﬁndings  are
also  of  signiﬁcant  practical  interest  given  that  propranolol  is a widely  used  drug  in  different  settings,  and
is  currently  being  considered  as a potential  treatment  for post-traumatic  stress  disorder  in  military  and
rescue  service  personnel.. Introduction
Propranolol is a beta-adrenoceptor antagonist that suppresses
oradrenergic activation by blocking beta 1 and beta 2 adrenore-
eptors. These receptors are located in target areas of the peripheral
ympathetic nervous system, as well as in various brain regions
ncluding the amydgala (Chamberlain et al., 2006). Several studies
ave shown that single doses of propranolol inﬂuence emotional
rocessing (Hurlemann et al., 2010; Van Stegeren et al., 2005),
nd that propranolol reduces physiological markers of high arousal
heart rate, potentiated startle response) following emotion-
voking stimuli (Davis et al., 1993; Mills and Dimsdale, 1991). In
ddition, functional neuroimaging studies have shown that pro-
ranolol leads to a reduction in amygdala responses to highly
motional pictures or emotional facial expressions (Hurlemann
t al., 2010; Strange and Dolan, 2004; Van Stegeren et al., 2005).
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Although propranolol was originally developed for hyperten-
sion, its inhibitory effect on the physiological aspects of emotional
arousal also makes it an effective and widely used treatment for
stress, acute anxiety, and performance anxiety (e.g., Tyrer and
Lader, 1974; Weatley, 1969). Recent research has suggested that,
by reducing the consolidation of emotional memory, propranolol
might also be an effective treatment for post-traumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD), whether by being administered before exposure to
a potentially traumatic situation or immediately afterwards (Mills
and Dimsdale, 1991; Pitmann et al., 2002; Stein et al., 2007; Vaiva
et al., 2003). The possibility that propranolol could be used in
this way in the context of military or rescue operations raises
serious ethical concerns (Craigie, 2007; Wolfendale, 2008). For
example, Henry et al. (2007) speculated that propranolol might,
by decreasing anxiety, alter practical decisions in war, such as
assessment of danger or of others’ needs. The President’s Council
on Bioethics (2003, p. 224) warned that propranolol might dimin-
ish decision quality by reducing the physiological arousal that
Open access under CC BY license.normally guides certain acts. However, the possible inﬂuence of
propranolol on moral decision-making has not yet been studied.
The  present study aimed to investigate the relation between
propranolol and moral decision-making. This relation is of
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onsiderable practical interest, but it might also shed new light
n an important theoretical debate about the role of emotion in
oral decision-making (Huebner et al., 2008). Recent research has
uggested that moral judgments are often based on immediate
motion-laden intuitions or gut reactions, with little input from
easoning (Haidt, 2001). A central strand of research in this area has
nvestigated responses to hypothetical ‘personal’ moral dilemmas
n which, in order to save several lives, it is necessary to directly
arm or even kill an innocent person. Functional neuroimaging
tudies have reported that responses to such ‘personal’ dilemmas
re associated with increased activation in brain areas implicated
n emotional processing, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cor-
ex (VMPC) and amygdala, compared to responses to ‘impersonal’
ilemmas where the harm is less direct (Greene et al., 2001, 2004).
t has been argued that ‘deontological’ moral judgments opposing
ersonal harm, even at the cost of a greater number of lives lost,
re based on a pre-potent emotional aversion to harming others,
ut that this emotional response can sometimes be overcome with
ffort, leading to a more reason-based utilitarian response (Greene
t al., 2004; Greene, 2008). In line with this hypothesis, patients
ith damage to the VMPC exhibit increased utilitarian judgement
n response to high conﬂict personal dilemmas compared to healthy
ndividuals, a ﬁnding which has been attributed to a deﬁcit in
ocial emotion (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007). In
ddition, Moretto et al. (2010) report that healthy individuals, but
ot patients with VMPC damage, generated a skin conductance
esponse (SCR), a somatic marker of affective arousal, before mak-
ng utilitarian judgments in personal dilemmas. Moreover, this
nticipatory SCR was negatively correlated with the frequency of
uch utilitarian judgments in healthy individuals.
This research suggests that aversion to harm in personal moral
ilemmas is at least partly mediated by emotional arousal. Since
ropranolol has been consistently shown to reduce noradrenergic
ediated physiological arousal, it offers a means to investigate the
ole of such arousal in moral judgement. We  hypothesised that if
eontological judgments against personal harm are based on an
mmediate negative affective response then propranolol, compared
o placebo, should lead to an increase in utilitarian judgement (Levy,
007). The present study was designed to assess this hypothesis by
nvestigating the effect of a single dose of propranolol on moral
ecision-making in healthy volunteers.
. Method
.1. Participants
Forty participants (20 males/20 females; mean age: 24.3; 34 were stu-
ents)  were recruited via poster and newspaper advertisement. Participants were
nstructed to refrain from alcohol or coffee 24 h before the study. Full written con-
ent was obtained from all participants and the study was  approved by the central
ational Health Service ethics committee.
.2. Procedure
Individuals were ﬁrst screened to exclude those with any medical contraindi-
ation  for propranolol (e.g., asthma, low blood pressure). Participants with any past
r present Axis 1 Psychiatric Disorder, as measured using the Structured Clinical
nterview  for DSM-IV (SCID-IV), were also excluded.
Propranolol (40 mg) or placebo was administrated in identical capsules in a
arallel group design in which each participant was randomised to receive either
ropranolol or placebo in a double blind manner. Participants’ pulse rate was
ecorded  using a pulse oximeter. Measures were obtained immediately prior to
ablet administration, and at 30 min  intervals thereafter. Additionally, participants’
ood  was  assessed using Visual Analogue scales (0–10 anchors) at three time
oints (before, 60 min  after, and 150 min  after propranolol/placebo administration)
n  which participants rated how sad, happy, alert, tired, angry or anxious they felt.The moral decision task was  presented on a computer using e-prime software
0  min after propranolol/placebo administration. The task included 20 hypothetical
oral dilemmas, drawn from Koenigs et al. (2007) (see Supplementary materials
or  a full list of moral dilemmas). Of these, 15 were ‘personal’ (i.e., involving ‘up-
lose-and-personal’ harm) and 5 were ‘impersonal’ (based on Greene et al., 2001).Fig. 1. Heart rate change in propranolol and placebo groups.
Personal dilemmas were mostly ‘high conﬂict’ dilemmas (N = 13), on which there
is no general consensus about the answer (as classiﬁed by Koenigs et al., 2007; see
also Kahane and Shackel, 2010). Of the 15 personal dilemmas, 7 described scenarios
where the victim of the proposed harmful act would inevitably die even if this act
were not chosen (Huebner et al., 2011). All dilemmas were presented in random
order.
Participants  read the dilemmas on screen in their own time, and responded
using  the keypad. Participants were asked to rate how morally acceptable the action
was on a 6 point scale (0, completely morally unacceptable; 5, completely morally
acceptable),  and whether they would themselves perform this action (0, absolutely
not;  5, absolutely yes).
An  example of a personal moral dilemma is The Crying Baby dilemma:
Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all remaining
civilians.  You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge in the cellar of a
large house. Outside you hear the voices of soldiers who have come to search the
house for valuables. Your baby begins to cry loudly. You cover his mouth to block
the sound. If you remove your hand from his mouth his crying will summon the
attention of the soldiers who will kill you, your child, and the others hiding out in
the cellar. To save yourself and the others you must smother your child to death.
How morally acceptable is it to smother your child in order to save yourself and the
other townspeople?
Would you smother your child in order to save yourself and the other townspeople?
Participants’  responses and their response times (measured at the onset of the
question) were recorded. Participants also performed a task that measured implicit
attitudes to other groups; the results of that investigation has been reported sepa-
rately (Terbeck et al., 2012).
3. Results
t-Tests for independent sample revealed that the propranolol
and placebo group did not differ in age, or body mass index (both
ps > .05). Repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for the
six mood ratings from the visual analogue scales showed that there
were no differences in reported mood between the propranolol and
placebo group at any time (all p > .05).
A  2 treatment (propranolol vs. placebo) × 5 (times) repeated
measures ANOVA was  conducted to assess the heart rate change
(difference in heart rate from the baseline recording). A signiﬁcant
interaction of time and group was found, F(4,35) = 9.27, p = .002.
Post hoc t-tests showed that the decrease in heart rate was  signiﬁ-
cantly greater in the propranolol as compared to the placebo group
at 90 min, t(38) = −2.54, p = .02, and 120 min, t(38) = −2.50, p = .02,
after treatment (see Fig. 1).
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mechanisms may  explain our results.ig. 2. Mean moral acceptability ratings for personal and impersonal moral dilem-
as in propranolol and placebo groups.
For moral judgement responses two different means (one for
he 15 personal dilemmas and one for the 5 impersonal dilemmas)
ere calculated. The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test showed that the
ample was not normally distributed (p < .05). Therefore data were
og transformed, and 3 sub scores from the placebo group, which
ere detected as outliers, were not included. This led to optimal
olmogorov–Smirnov tests for personal and impersonal dilemmas
n placebo and propranolol group (all ps = .20).
We conducted separate ANOVAs for the moral acceptability
uestion (“Is the action morally acceptable?”) and for the per-
ormance question (“Would you perform the action?”). First a
 (treatment: propranolol vs. placebo) × 2 (dilemma type: per-
onal vs. impersonal) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the moral
cceptability question. We  found a main effect of dilemma type
F(1,35) = 123.39, p < .00). We  also found a signiﬁcant dilemma
ype × treatment interaction (F(1,35) = 5.20, p = .03). Individuals
enerally rated the proposed action in personal dilemmas (M = .36,
D = 23) as less morally acceptable than in impersonal dilemmas
M = .59, SD = .10), t(36) = −7.83, p < .00; t(39) = 12.00, p < .00. Impor-
antly, participants in the propranolol group rated actions as less
orally acceptable (M = .27, SD = .28) than did participants in the
lacebo group (M = .43, SD = .11) in personal, t(37) = 2.18, p = .04;
 = .72, but not in impersonal, t(37) = 1.07, p = .29, moral dilemmas
see Fig. 2).
A  2 (treatment: propranolol vs. placebo) × 2 (dilemma type:
ersonal vs. impersonal) mixed ANOVA was also performed on
he performance question. This revealed a main effect of dilemma
ype, F(38,1) = 147.20, p < .00, but no interaction of main effect
ith treatment (all ps > .2). Overall individuals were more likely
o rate that they would perform the action in impersonal (M = .56,
D = .07) as compared to personal (M = .25, SD = .20) moral dilem-
as, t(39) = 12.00, p < .00. In addition there were no response time
ifferences for the performance question.
As could be expected, there was a signiﬁcant correlation
etween the answers to the moral acceptability question and the
erformance question (r = .53, p = .00). However, individuals gener-
lly rated the moral acceptability of the proposed act as higher than
hey rated their willingness to actually perform this act. This wasology 92 (2013) 323– 328 325
the  case both for personal, t(39) = 2.95, p = .01, and for impersonal,
t(38) = 3.12, p = .00, moral dilemmas.
A previous study has reported a positive correlation between
working memory capacity and utilitarian judgement in personal
dilemmas (Moore et al., 2008), but only in dilemmas where the act
endorsed (e.g., killing one person to save ﬁve others) would not
make the person harmed worse off, because they would inevitably
suffer this harm (because, for example, everyone would die if one
does not act; cf. Huebner et al., 2011). Since some studies have
suggested that propranolol can reduce working memory capacity
(Chamberlain et al., 2006; Müller et al., 2005), we controlled for
this possible inﬂuence by performing a 2 (treatment: propranolol
vs. placebo) × 2 (dilemma type: inevitable vs. non-inevitable harm)
mixed ANOVA. There was  no main effect of or interaction involving
dilemma type (all ps > .2), suggesting that the effect we  observed
was not moderated by working memory capacity. In addition, we
found no effect or co-variance of gender with any of the observed
effects (all ps > .2).
A 2 (treatment: propranolol vs. placebo) × 2 (dilemma type:
personal vs. impersonal) mixed ANOVA was  also computed for
response times for the acceptability question. We found a sig-
niﬁcant main effect of dilemma type, F(1,38) = 4.65, p = .04. The
dilemma type and group interaction was  found to be signiﬁ-
cant (F(1,38) = 5.94, p = .02). Individuals in the placebo group took
signiﬁcantly longer to rate the moral acceptability of acts in
personal (M = 7517.21, SD = 2596.02) as compared to impersonal
(M = 6374.09, SD = 2139.90) dilemmas (t(19) = −2.58, p = .02). For
the propranolol group the difference in response time for per-
sonal (M = 6519.6533, SD = 2041.58) and impersonal (M = 6424.61,
SD = 2011.10) dilemmas was  not signiﬁcant (p > .05) (see Fig. 3).
There were no group differences on the performance question (all
ps > .2). In addition, we found no signiﬁcant differences in response
times between propranolol and placebo group in personal or imper-
sonal dilemmas in the performance question (both ps > .05).
Finally, we investigated whether individuals in the propranolol
group were more decisive in their judgement of moral accept-
ability. Scores of 2 or 3 on moral judgments were categorised as
indecisive (i.e., neither clearly deontological nor utilitarian), and
scores of 0 or 1 and 4 or 5 as decisive (i.e., clearly either deonto-
logical or utilitarian). On average, participants in the propranolol
group made 29.3% indecisive judgments, compared to 40.7% in
the placebo group. A Mann–Whitney U-test conﬁrmed that indi-
viduals in the propranolol group made more decisive judgments
(U = 123.00; z = −2.10, p = .04) in personal moral dilemmas.
4. Discussion
Suppression of noradrenergic-mediated arousal by propranolol
was associated with a signiﬁcant difference in moral judgement
compared to placebo, suggesting a causal role for noradrenergic
pathways in moral decision-making. Contrary to our hypothesis,
subjects who took propranolol were more likely to make deon-
tological judgments, and to reject contrary utilitarian solutions to
moral dilemmas, but only when these utilitarian solutions involved
‘up close and personal’ harm to an innocent victim. Propranolol was
also associated with reduced response times and increased ‘deci-
siveness’ compared to placebo. It was  also associated with reduced
heart rate, suggesting that the observed effects may be due to a
general reduction in emotional arousal. In what follows we exam-
ine the implications of these ﬁndings for recent debates about the
role of emotion in moral decision-making, and consider what causalPrevious research has been taken to show that deontological
judgments are largely driven by emotion (Greene, 2008). However,
our results suggest that general emotional physiological arousal
326 T. Sylvia et al. / Biological Psychology 92 (2013) 323– 328
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s not likely to play an essential role in generating deontological
udgments. Propranolol in single doses is a well established tech-
ique for assessing the role of noradrenaline pathways in emotional
esponses (Cahill et al., 1994; Harmer et al., 2001; Hurlemann et al.,
010). Although we found no signiﬁcant difference in self reported
ood between the propranolol and placebo groups, heart rates
n the propranolol group were signiﬁcantly lower, suggesting a
eduction in physiological arousal, in line with numerous previ-
us studies (Hurlemann et al., 2010; Strange and Dolan, 2004; Van
tegeren et al., 2005). However, our results cannot rule out that
eontological judgments nevertheless involve secondary emotions
uch as guilt, which may  be based more on cognitive appraisal than
n physiological arousal (Johnson-Laird and Oatley, 1992).
It  is unclear at this stage why reduction in noradrenergic-
ediated  arousal would lead to an increase in deontological
udgement. Rogers et al. (2004) reported that propranolol reduced
he discrimination between large and small possible losses in a
ambling task when the probability of winning was  relatively low
nd the probability of losing was high. Since personal moral dilem-
as can be understood as involving a choice between two options
hat involve highly probable (or even certain) loss of life, it might
e suggested that participants under propranolol were exhibiting
 similar lack of discrimination between differences in magnitude
f overall loss. However, if propranolol generally reduced concern
or consequences, it should affect responses to both personal and
mpersonal dilemmas, whereas we observed an increase in deon-
ological judgement only in personal dilemmas.
It seems more likely that the observed effect was due to an
ncrease in aversion to harming others, in line with extensive evi-
ence that propranolol reduces aggression (Greendyke et al., 1984,
986; Silver et al., 1999; Yudofsky et al., 1981). Interestingly, a
ecrease in aggression has also been associated with selective
erotonin reuptake inhibitors such as citalopram (Armenteros and
ewis, 2002; Vartiainen et al., 1995), which have recently also been
hown to increase deontological judgement (Crockett et al., 2010).
In line with this suggestion, propranolol inﬂuenced moral judge-
ent only in ‘personal’ dilemmas, where in order to save more
ives, one had to engage in an up close and personal act of directrsonal moral dilemmas in both groups.
violence  against a single innocent person (Greene et al., 2001). This
selective effect is in line with previous studies where psychophysi-
ological interventions or neural damage affected moral judgement
only in personal dilemmas or a ‘high conﬂict’ subset of such dilem-
mas (Crockett et al., 2010; Koenigs et al., 2007; Tassy et al., 2012;
Youssef et al., 2012). Note that although there was a greater con-
sensus in responses to ‘impersonal’ moral dilemmas which did not
involve such direct harm (as indicated by lower standard deviation:
.592 compared to .972), the selective effect was not due to a ﬂoor
or ceiling effect in these impersonal dilemmas, given that we used
a continuous (0–5 scale) rather than binary measure of moral per-
missibility, and permissibility ratings for both dilemma categories
showed normally distributed data with M = 3.91 (impersonal) and
M = 2.44 (personal).
It is intriguing that although propranolol increased rates of
deontological judgement in personal dilemmas, it did not have a
parallel affect on subjects’ willingness to perform the proposed
act. This difference may, however, reﬂect a ﬂoor effect, given that
most subjects were already generally averse to actually performing
harmful acts even when they rated them morally acceptable.
Another intriguing result is the increase in decisiveness in moral
judgement, coupled with a decrease in response time in personal
dilemmas, compared to the placebo group. These ﬁndings are in line
with previous research suggesting that deontological judgments in
such dilemmas are based on an intuitive response (Cushman et al.,
2006; Kahane et al., 2012). They suggest that subjects under pro-
pranolol engaged in less deliberation, and were more conﬁdent of
their immediate responses than subjects who received a placebo.
Although some studies have associated propranolol with reduced
working memory capacity (Chamberlain et al., 2006; Müller et al.,
2005), this is unlikely to explain this effect, since the only study so
far to establish a direct relation between working memory capacity
and utilitarian judgement found such a relation only in dilemmas
where the personal harm was inevitable (Moore et al., 2008) and
such a selective effect was not observed in the present study. It
seems more likely that an increase in aversion to harming caused
the deontological response to strongly dominate decision-making,
leading both to an increase in deontological judgement and to
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aster and more decisive responses. In addition, it is possible that
he reduction in anxiety that is associated with propranolol (Tyrer
nd Lader, 1974; Weatley, 1969) also played a role in increasing
udgement conﬁdence.
Propranolol operates on noradrenergic pathways both in the
entral and the peripheral nervous system. Further research using
 peripherally acting beta-adrenoceptor antagonist is thus needed
o determine whether the observed effect of propranolol on moral
ecision making is due to central beta-adrenoceptor blockade or to
ntagonist effects in the peripheral sympathetic nervous system.
n addition, more sensitive measures of heart rate and other mark-
rs of physiological arousal are needed to investigate the temporal
ourse of emotional arousal when individuals under propranolol
re engaged with moral dilemmas.
Crockett et al. (2010) report that a single dose of the noradren-
line re-uptake inhibitor, atomoxetine, failed to inﬂuence moral
udgement in a selection of personal moral dilemmas, whereas
rom our ﬁndings a decrease in deontological judgements might be
xpected. However, atomoxetine would be expected to facilitate
eurotransmission at both alpha and beta adrenoceptors; hence its
ffect on moral decision-making might not be simply contrary to
hat of propranolol. It should also be noted that the Crockett et al.
tudy employed a within group design while we  used a between
roup method. While our design avoids the issue of learning effects,
t is open to the objection that our ﬁndings may be confounded by
aseline differences between the two groups. We  tried to minimise
his possibility by careful demographic matching of the treatment
roups but it would be of interest to see if our ﬁndings can be
eplicated in a cross-over design.
Although further research is needed to clarify the exact role
f noradrenergic arousal in moral judgement, our study provides
trong evidence that propranolol, a widely used drug, can inﬂu-
nce moral decision-making. Our ﬁnding is especially important in
he context of the ongoing debate about the potential use of pro-
ranolol in the prevention or treatment of post-traumatic stress
isorder in military or rescue service personnel (Donovan, 2010;
enry et al., 2007), given that the hypothetical dilemmas used in
he present study involve such difﬁcult decisions in extreme emer-
ency situations.
ppendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found,
n the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho
2012.09.005.
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